Consider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with heterogenous agents who can either play fair or cheat. We model heterogeneity by assuming that the players are either high or low types. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of the model: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular we find that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents are maximally segregated.
Introduction
In this paper we consider an evolutionary game where agents competing for a prize can either play fair or cheat. We want to identify the determinants that eventually lead to an absorbing state of the imitation dynamics in which all agents use the cheating strategy when initially all but one agent play fair. We are interested to identify the role of heterogeneity and the role of information for this process. In particular, we would like to know how the distribution of types, i.e. the segregation of the population determines the imitation dynamics.
To study these issues we consider an evolutionary game in which a finite number of infinitely lived agents are matched pairwise to play a 2 × 2 stage game.
In each stage game, the agents compete for a prize of value w by either playing "fair" or "cheat." Agents are of two types: high or low. High types have a natural advantage over low types: they obtain the prize w with certainty if they meet a low type and if both use the same strategy. If, however, a low type cheats against a fair playing high type, he beats the high type with certainty and receives the prize w. If two players of the same type meet and if both use the same strategy, they share the prize of value w. Cheating is costly where the cost c satisfies 0 < c < w.
1
Because our agents are heterogenous there are two stage games. First, if two agents of the same type meet, the stage game is a Prisoner's Dilemma where cheating (playing fair) is the dominant strategy if the cost of cheating is sufficiently low (high). Second, if two agents of opposite type meet, the stage game is an asymmetric game similar to a matching penny game. In this game, the low type's best response is the strategy that is not used by the high type, and the high type's best response is the strategy that the low type is using.
In each period each agent is matched sequentially to all other agents, i.e. agents interact globally. At the end of the period, each agent observes the strategies and average payoffs of a subset of all agents, called the information set of an agent. In the following period, agents imitate the strategy with the highest average payoff in their information set.
2 To formalize these sets we locate the 1 One application we have in mind is the spread of a new doping substance in sports, where athletes with different talents may learn how to use this substance to improve their winning probabilities. Other applications are crime or corruption. The relevant question here is under which circumstances a previously peaceful (honest) society can turn violent (corrupt).
2 A few years ago at the Tour de France, some cyclists began to use somewhat odd looking agents on a circle as in Ellison (1993) . In most parts of the paper, we focus on two information settings: "local" information and "global" information. With local information agents observe the strategies and payoffs of their immediate neighbors on the circle only. If agents have global information, they observe the strategies and payoffs of all agents.
3
In order to get a benchmark we first analyze the model when all agents are identical. In this case the stage game is a Prisoner's Dilemma where cheating is the dominant strategy if c < w/2. With equal agents we find that the information setting has no influence for the set of absorbing states. That is, we show that the cardinality of the information set only affects the time elapsing until the set of absorbing states is reached. Moreover, the location of the innovator of the cheating strategy is irrelevant -a result which is hardly surprising given that all agents are equal.
These results motivated us to study the role of heterogeneity in our model.
With heterogenous agents there are three crucial factors that determine the spread of the cheating strategy: the location and the type of the innovator of the cheating strategy, the distribution of types on the circle, and the information available to the agents. These factors determine whether the innovator is able to infect his neighbors and eventually to contaminate the entire population. Since many different distributions of types on the circle are feasible -each of them having potentially different implications for the limiting distribution -we focus on two polar cases: maximal segregation and minimal segregation. In a maximally segregated population high types and low types are allocated in two clusters so nose stickers. They were supposed to increase breathing capacity and thereby the prospects of winning the race. Very soon after the first few cyclists had used these stickers, they were adopted by virtually all others. However, the following year, the stickers had almost disappeared again presumably because they did not enhance performance. This is an example of the imitation behavior we have in mind. We belief that it also describe well how illegal performance enhancing substances, which are not observed in public, spread in sports. 3 In sports, say tennis, all agents compete against all other agents (global interaction). Nevertheless, the players -for obvious reasons -only share information about the use of illegal performance enhancing drugs with their best mates (local information). To describe a situation in which agents interact globally but have only local information about payoffs and strategies, consider a finite number of myopic agents in a computer lab where the computers are allocated in a circle. In each period each agent plays a stage game against each other agent in the lab. At the end of the period each agent observes his average payoff for the period. In addition he observes the screens of his immediate neighbors which reveals their strategies and their average payoffs in that period. Using this information, each agent at the end of the period imitates the strategy with the highest average payoff.
that there are only two players of each type that have a neighbor of the opposite type. In a minimally segregated population each agent has two neighbors of opposite type.
The following results emerge from the model with heterogenous agents and local information. First, the population is more likely to end up in an absorbing state where all agents cheat if the innovator is a low type. Second, if the innovator is a low type, then a minimally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a maximally segregated population. The reason for this result is that in a minimally segregated population each low type (including the innovator) is surrounded by high types who are less prone to imitate the cheating strategy. Third, in contrast, if the innovator is a high type, a maximally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a minimally segregated population. The reason for this result is that the innovator is again surrounded by high types who are less prone to imitate the cheating strategy.
The role of information with heterogenous agents is as follows. First, with global information, in contrast to local information, the location and the type of the innovator of the cheating strategy and the distribution of types on the circle are irrelevant. Second, local information reduces the spread of the cheating strategy if agents are minimally segregated relative to a situation where agents have global information. For a maximally segregated population this result is only true if the innovator is a high type. Third, with local information some agents under-and some overestimate the true benefit of the cheating strategy.
There is no such effect with complete information where each player type knows the true benefit of each strategy for his type.
Our paper is most closely related to Ellison (1993) , Eshel et al. (1998) , and Kandori et al. (1993) . Kandori et al. (1993) consider the limiting distribution when individual mutation rates go to zero for the class of 2 × 2 stage games.
The players' period payoffs are the expected values of the stage game given the (distribution of) strategy choices of all players. Like Kandori et al. (1993) we assume "global interaction." Ellison (1993) investigates the limiting distributions and the speed of convergence in a similar model as Kandori et al. (1993) . The crucial difference is that players interact and obtain information locally. Also, Ellison (1993) focuses on coordination games. Summarizing, Kandori et al. (1993) investigate global interaction and global information and Ellison (1993) local interaction and local information. In contrast, we combine local information with global interaction. Moreover, we introduce heterogeneity among agents, which generates different stage games. Finally, we adopt the imitation rule of Eshel et al. (1998) where players can only play the strategies they observe in their information set. Like Ellison (1993) , Eshel et al. (1998) may be classified as a local interaction and local information game.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model with homogenous agents. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the model with heterogenous agents and global and local information, respectively. In Section 5, we allow for mutations. Section 6 concludes.
The Model with Homogeneous Agents
In this section, we set up the model with homogeneous agents. We first describe the stage game, specify how agents are located and how they adopt or choose new strategies. We then analyze the absorbing strategy states.
The Stage Game
We consider a finite population with N > 1 agents denoted by i = 1, ..., N who live forever. In every period t, the agents are sequentially matched to all other agents to play a 2 × 2 stage game. In each stage game, the agents compete for a prize of value w. The strategy space is {C, D}, where C stands for playing "clean" respectively fair and D for cheating respectively playing "doped." Within a period, a player cannot change his or her pure strategy. Furthermore, mixed strategies are ruled out.
The payoffs of the stage game are as follows. If both agents play the strategy C, each gets 
The stage game defined in (1) is a Prisoner's Dilemma (Weibull 1995) . If c ≶ w 2 , D, respectively C, is the dominant strategy.
Agent i's period payoff in period t, u i,t , is the average payoff from the N − 1 matches, i.e.
where σ i,t is his strategy in period t, σ −i,t are the strategies chosen by all other players in period t, and the payoffs a(., .) are the corresponding elements of A in (1).
Location and Imitation
In order to model incomplete information, we assume that agents are located on a circle on the positions 1, 2, 3, ..., N . In each period, each agent i obtains information about the period payoffs and the strategies chosen by the agents
Dropping the arguments in u i,t (σ i,t , σ −i,t ), we define agent i's information set
, the information set contains information about all agents on the circle. In this case, we say that agents have global information. If k < N 2 the information set contains not all relevant information. If k = 1, agents observe strategies and payoffs of their direct neighbors only. We call this information setting local information.
We now turn to the question how agents use their information. Following Eshel et al. (1998) , we assume that at the end of every period t, the agents observe
In the following period, they play the strategy that generated the highest average payoff. 
The first term is the average payoff of those agents in the information set that play D and the second term is the average payoff of those agents that play C.
The imitation dynamics satisfies the following rule.
Definition 1 The imitation rule is
if both strategies C and D are observed in G i,t (k). Otherwise, the agent continues to use the same strategy.
4 Agents who choose strategies according to an imitation rule can interpret the information they receive in two different ways. They can either imitate the most successful player or the most successful strategy they observe. The former imitation rule is used by Vega-Redondo (1997) and Alos-Ferrer et al. (2000) and others, the latter e.g. by Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) . We will adhere to an imitation rule of the second kind, where success of a strategy is measured by its average payoff.
The imitation rule implies that if ∆ i,t = 0, then σ i,t+1 = σ i,t , and for ∆ i,t ≶ 0, we have σ i,t+1 = C, respectively D. If a strategy is not observed in an agent's information set, then the agent continues to use the strategy of the current period.
Note that an agent's behavior depends solely on the strategies observed in his neighborhood in the immediate past. That is, neither the shadow of the future nor the shadow of the more distant past bear any weight for the choice of strategy (Berninghaus et al. 2003 ).
In the following we will suppress the time index t. We denote by y the number of agents playing C. This allows us to write agent i's payoff of playing
The first term in (3) 
Note that ∆ i is independent of y. That is, despite D being a strictly dominated strategy, all individuals will end up playing it. The reason for this result is that an agent playing D is matched to one D−player less than an agent playing C. This increases the benefit of using strategy D relative to C.
Absorbing States
A state is a specification of which agents play C and which play D. At time t, we describe the state s t of the system by an N -tuple
where S is the set of possible states. If i and j are two possible strategy states in S, p ij is the probability that the imitation rule changes the system to state j given that i is the current state. The imitation rule in (2) and the non-stochastic nature of the payoffs result in a deterministic process such that p ij is either 0 or 1. The collection {p ij } i,j∈S , together with an initial state, is a Markov process on S. We will refer to this Markov process as the imitation dynamics of our model.
We are interested in the absorbing states of the imitation dynamics, which are defined as in Eshel et al. (1998) .
Definition 2 A set of states is absorbing if it is a minimal set of states with the property that the Markov process can lead into this set but not out of it.
An absorbing set of states may contain only one state. If an absorbing set contains more than one state, the Markov process cycles between the states contained in the absorbing set.
¿From now on, we normalize w = 1 (and consequently c is now assumed to be ∈ (0, 1)). Moreover, we concentrate on the polar cases; either the size of the information set is k = 1 or k = 
The Role of Information
Throughout the paper, we study the spread of D in a population in which in t = 1 all agents but one play C. , the absorbing state D, respectively C, is reached in period 2.
Global Information
The proof is straightforward. If all agents observe the strategies and payoffs of all other agents, ∆ i is the same for all i = 1, 2, ..., N . Consequently, when an agent introduces D in period 1, depending on whether ∆ i is positive or negative, all agents will play C or D from period 2 on until the end of time. This result has been shown to hold by Kandori et al. (1993) in a more general setting.
Local information
We now consider the case where the agents observe their immediate neighbors only (k = 1).
Proposition 2 , the absorbing state D is reached in period
, the absorbing state C is reached in period 2.
The proof of Proposition 2 is intuitive. If c < , ∆ i is negative. Consequently, D dies out immediately.
Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2, we see that the size of the information set only affects the time elapsing until the absorbing state is reached.
In particular, it does not matter which player introduces strategy D because all agents are identical. In the following section we therefore introduce heterogeneity among the agents to see how this influences the imitation dynamics.
Heterogenous Agents with Global Information
In this section we investigate the role of heterogeneity when agents are globally informed.
In Section 4 we then analyze local information.
Asymmetric Games
We introduce heterogeneity by assuming that agents are either of high type ( If two agents of the same type meet, the stage game is a prisoner's dilemma where strategy D is the dominant strategy if c < 1/2 as with homogenous agents.
In contrast, if two agents of opposite type meet the game is asymmetric and has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. In this case, the stage game is a matching penny game where each player's best response is the strategy not chosen by the other agent.
We denote by y H the number of H-types playing C, and by y L the number of L-types playing C. The numbers of H-types and L-types are denoted by n H and n L , respectively, with n H + n L = N . The period payoffs of H-types and L-types
Note that the second term in ( 
The Role of Information
The imitation rule (2) still applies and we continue to study the spread of D from an initial situation where all agents but one play C. A state where all agents of the same type play the same strategy is denoted by − → σ H − → σ L where the first component means that all H-types play σ H , the second component that all L-types play σ L .
Proposition 3 When agents are heterogenous and have global information, then
, the absorbing state D D ( C C) is reached in period 2.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix.
According to Proposition 3 when information is global, then it is immaterial which type of player innovates D. Intuitively, with global information all agents have the same information. Consequently, all agents follow the same decision rule.
¿From Propositions 2 and 3 we see that heterogeneity does not affect the absorbing states, if agents have information about strategies and payoffs of all agents but no information about types. In the following we will see that heterogeneity matters if agents can recognize the types of all agents, or if they are locally informed about strategies and payoffs. Before we consider local information in Section 4, let us consider the model when all agents observe all strategies, all payoffs, and all types. We call this information structure the "complete information" benchmark. With complete information, agents of the same type make the same strategy decisions. Note that for the complete information benchmark we interpret the imitation rule (2) as follows. When applying (2), agents of the same type compare only payoffs and strategies across agents of their own type.
5
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 When agents are heterogenous and have complete information, then the following is true. If c < min{
}, the absorbing state is C C.
Since all players have both strategies available at any point in time, agents of the same type will always play the same strategy. Obviously, if costs are small (large), all agents play D (C). However, in contrast to the game with global information, there is an absorbing set in which agents cycle between C and D.
This absorbing set is attained if costs are such that D (C) pays for a single agent of either type when all others play C (D).
6
In the remainder of the paper, we concentrate on heterogenous agents with local information.
Heterogenous Agents with Local Information
With heterogenous types and local information, the allocation of types along the circle matters because it affects the payoffs of the strategies C and D which an agent observes in his information set G i (1). Consequently, in contrast to the case with homogeneous agents, G i (1) does not reveal the true benefit of a strategy to a player. For example, a large payoff of a neighbor can now be due to either the strategy chosen (which is observed) or the unobservable H-type. In this section, we first classify the agents according to their location, which determines the perceived period payoff of the strategies C and D. We then investigate the implication of local information and heterogeneity for the imitation dynamics. 
The Role of Information
Note that the players at both ends (H E on position 1 and L EE on position N on the circle) are immediate neighbors. Let us now determine the strategy choices for the three locations by calculating the decision terms ∆ introduced above.
Interior Player An interior player has only information about agents of his own type. Consequently, an interior player only observes differences in payoffs if different strategies have been played. We write these payoff differences as
If 
Consider, for example, the first term in (8). It means that "L plays C, H E plays D and H plays D." The strategy strings CCD and CDC do not differ with respect to the observed average payoffs. In either case, the L-type and one H-type play C, while the other H-type plays D. Similarly, the strategy strings DDC and DCD yield also the same average payoffs for D and C, respectively.
We can summarize the decisions of H E by considering the observed differences ∆ q H E , where the superscript q refers to the rank of the term in (8). In the Appendix we show that the following ranking holds:
Thus, if for a clean edge player in a DCC string ∆ 4 H E > 0, all edge players and all interior players will play D in the following period.
An edge player of type L has an H-type and an L-type in his information group. We analyze HL E L because LL E H is analyzed in the same way. The possible strategy strings in the information group of L E are given in (8). We show in the Appendix that 
The reason for this is that an L-type player's payoff using C is always zero except when matched to another L-type player using C in which case his payoff is 1/2. In contrast, an H-type who plays C receives a positive payoff when matched to another H-type or to an L-type using C. Consequently, an edge player of type H underestimates the benefit of strategy C, respectively overestimates D, when his L-type neighbor plays C.
There are two crucial features of local information. First, certain agents (edge players and double-edge players) under-or overestimate strategy D, respectively, C. There is no such effect with complete information where each player type knows the true benefit of each strategy for his type. Second, local information permits some agents (interior players) to observe the true payoff difference of the two strategies for his type as explained above. In contrast, with global information and heterogenous players no agent ever observes the true payoff difference for his type. 
In the Appendix we show that the following ranking holds,
Like edge players, double-edge players over-or underestimate the payoff of strategy D to their type.
Maximal Segregation
Recall that we want to study how the strategy D evolves in a population in which initially all players but one play C. The agent who first plays D is called the innovator. Two factors determine the spread of D: The allocation of types along the circle and the location and type of the innovator.
We now consider a distribution of types that we call maximal segregation. In such a population H-types and L-types are allocated in two clusters as follows:
In a maximally segregated population, there are only two edge players for each type and no double-edge players. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the number of H-types and L-types is the same, i.e. n H = n L = n = N 2 .
Innovation and absorbing states
As explained above, for each type there are three classes of agents; interior, edge and double-edge players. Within the same class agents may choose different strategies because they have different information sets. Consequently, we have to distinguish the location of the innovator. Innovation by an interior player has a different implication for the imitation dynamics than an innovation from an edge player. Moreover, we have also to distinguish among interior players. An innovation through an interior player who is located within other interior players has different consequences than an innovation from an interior player who is located next to an edge player. We call these special interior players next-to-edge players and give them the superscript N E, while we still denote all other interior players by superscript I.
Proposition 5 If an L-type introduces D, then for c < it is C C.
If an H-type introduces D, then the following is true.
(i) If he is an interior player, then for c ≶ n 2 (N −1) , the absorbing state is D D, respectively C C.
(ii) If he is a next-to-edge player, then for c < , it is C C.
(iii) If he is an edge player, then for c < , the absorbing state is D D,
, it is C D * , and for c > , it is C C.
The absorbing state C D
players of type L play C or cycle between C and D depending on c and n.
Interestingly, the location of the innovator is irrelevant if the innovator is an L-
type. In contrast, if the innovator is an H-type, the location matters. Finally, the number of agents playing C can decrease in c when the innovation occurs through an H N E -or an H E -type. Without a finite population effect, the difference between an innovation by an 
Minimal Segregation of Types
After having characterized the absorbing states when the population is maximally segregated, we now consider the polar case of a minimally segregated population.
This means that we look at a population in which types are located as follows:
Evidently, a minimally segregated population consists of double-edge players only.
Consequently, there are only two different positions where the strategy D can be introduced, H EE and L EE . Again, we assume n H = n L = n.
Absorbing States
Recall that in a maximally segregated population, all agents of the same type play the same strategy in the absorbing state (with the only exception of edgeplayers of type L in some absorbing states). In contrast, in a minimally segregated population, not all agents of the same type will end up playing the same strategy.
This requires some additional notation.
We denote byC y HC y L a strategy state where the number of H-types and Ltypes playing C is y H and y L , respectively. In such a state, all agents of either type who play the same strategy are next to each other. Let us defineȳ as the greatest nonnegative odd (even) integer smaller than
if n is even (odd). Note that if 2c (N − 1) − n − 1 2 < 0, i.e. c < , we haveȳ = 0. In this case, the absorbing state isC 0C0 where all agents play D.
It is again possible that an absorbing set is attained in which two L-types cycle between D and C. We denote such an absorbing set byC y HC * y L .
Proposition 6
If an H-type introduces D, then the following is true. If c < , the absorbing state isC 0C0 , for it isC n−1Cn , and for c > , it isC nCn .
If an L-type introduces D, then the following is true. If c < , the absorbing state isC 0C0 , for it isCȳC * y−1 , and for c > . In this case, the absorbing state isC n−1Cn if the innovator is an H-type. Second, if the innovator infects its neighbors so that strategy D begins to spread, the spread can be only blocked by H-types.
Consequently, in any absorbing state where both strategies survive and where more than one player adopts strategy D there will be always one L−player more using D than H-players, i.e. the absorbing state is of typeCȳC * y−1 . Third, the absorbing stateC n−1Cn is special because the innovator is a H−type, which is not able to infect his L-type neighbors. Nevertheless, he continues to use D because strategy D yields a higher payoff in his information set. Consequently, the initial strategy string is stationary.
We illustrate Proposition 6 for n = 8 in Figure 3 . 
Maximal versus Minimal Segregation
We conclude this section with a comparison of the absorbing states of a maximally and of a minimally segregated population. For this comparison we calculate the expected share of agents playing C in the absorbing state when each agent is equally likely to innovate D. We focus on large populations (n → ∞) such that finite population effects can be neglected. Another consequence of this assumption is that the role of edge players (of which there are but two of each type in the maximally segregated population and none in the minimally segregated population) becomes negligible. , all agents play C in the absorbing state for both distributions of types.
These results follow from Propositions 5 and 6. They are depicted in Figure   6 . ) the minimally segregated population exhibits a higher share of agents playing C in the absorbing state than the maximally segregated population. The reason for this is that being located between L-types, the H-types are able to block the spread of strategy D. However, for sufficiently low cheating costs, i.e. for c ∈ (
), the maximally segregated population exhibits a higher share of agents playing C. The reason is that in a maximally segregated population L-types never observe D if the innovator is a H-type. In contrast, in a minimally segregated population, if D is introduced by a H-type, two L-type will observe it. And since L-types are more likely to be infected than H-types the population share of agents playing D is larger with minimal segregation.
Mutations
In this section we introduce mutations. In each period, after imitations have occurred, each agent's strategy changes with a small probability ε.
7 As mentioned before, the imitation dynamics is a Markov chain evolving over the strategy space S. A probability distribution over S in time t is represented as a row vector ν which is an element of the 2 N -dimensional simplex. The simplex Σ N is the set
The process evolves according to ν t+1 = ν t P , where P is the transition probability matrix defined in Section 2.3. Now that agents' strategies change with probability ε after imitation, the transition probability p ij is positive for all i and j, i.e. the Markov chain is regular. Thus, there exists a unique probability distribution
The vector µ is the unique stationary distribution of the regular Markov process, which does not depend on the initial probability distribution. The stationary distribution µ is stable, i.e.
¿From the law of large numbers for regular Markov chains we have
as T tends to infinity. 9 Therefore, the probabilities in the limiting distribution can be interpreted as average share of time the process spends in a given state.
The transition matrix P (ε) and the stationary distribution µ(ε) depend on ε.
The stationary and stable probability distribution µ(ε) describes the long-run behavior of the imitation dynamics with mutations. Since we are interested in the imitation dynamics for small ε, we consider the limiting distribution µ * :
The limiting distribution µ * , if it exists, depends on the parameter values {c, n} of our model. Even for very small populations, evaluating µ * involves solving a large equation system of 2 2n variables. Instead of finding µ (ε) explicitly and taking the limit for ε → 0, we approximate µ * numerically. We will describe µ * for a maximally segregated population and the smallest population size (n = 5) that provides all relevant positions of innovation (i.e. H I , H N E , H E , and L) as described previously. Our simulations suggest that the following results hold. , then Pr( C C) = 1.
We illustrate our conjecture for n = 5 and n → ∞ in the following Figures. , the model without mutations exhibits another lock-in, which arises if the innovation occurs through an H I -or an H N E -type. For c >
Conclusions
In this paper we consider an evolutionary game where agents can either play fair or cheat. A cheating agent bears some direct utility cost but wins the stage game against a fair playing agent with certainty. The paper extends the standard framework of an evolutionary game by introducing heterogeneity among agents. We consider the imitation dynamics when initially all agents play fair and one agent invents the cheating strategy. In contrast to the standard framework, with heterogenous agents the absorbing state depends on the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types on the circle, and the information (i.e. local or global) available to the agents. The paper shows how these factors determine whether the innovator is able to infect his neighbors and eventually to contaminate the entire population.
We focus on two distribution of types: maximal (equal types are located next to each other) and minimal (agents have always neighbors of opposite type) segregation. The following results emerge from the model. First, the population is more likely to end up in an absorbing state where all agents cheat if the innovator is a low type. Second, if the innovator is a low type, then a minimally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a maximally segregated population. Third, in contrast, if the innovator is a high type, a maximally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a minimally segregated population.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 3
If the innovating agent is an H-type, the initial numbers of clean agents are
If the innovator is an L-type, these numbers are
We first notice that due to global information we have that
We therefore drop the type group index of the decision terms.
If the innovation arises from an H-type, the decision term for all agents is
From (4) and (5) we get
Using this information we get
If the innovation arises from an L-type agent, the difference in the average payoffs
Consequently, the origin of the innovation does not matter if agents have no type information.
Proof of Proposition 4
If agents have complete information, they have both strategies available at any point in time, distinguish types and are able to calculate the payoff they would have gotten having played the other strategy. Under these circumstances the imitation rule (2) can be interpreted as a best response dynamics. As before, we can define suitable decision terms. We have
At the end of the first period the agents decide either to play
Note that D C will not be played in the second period because of
∆ H and ∆ L do these strategy states imply?
• All play C (situation C C), implies
From (13) and (14) it is clear that C C is an equilibrium strategy state if
If c does not satisfy one of these two conditions we can work out the following cycle by using the ∆-functions above:
}] we will observe an absorbing set of strategy states. The imitation dynamics cycles between the four strategy states C D, D D, D C, C C , where a single agent plays C for two periods followed by D for two periods etc. The strategy states specific to the two type groups are shifted in time by one or three periods, depending on where in the cycle we start to count.
Decision Terms for Edge Players
The decision terms for an edge player of type H are
For an edge player of type L we get
Decision Terms for Double-Edge Players
For a double-edge player of type H the decision terms are
and for a double-edge player of type L they are
Proof of Proposition 5
We accomplish the proof of Proposition 5 in two parts. We first consider the absorbing states when an L-type introduces D.
L-type introduces D.
In the following we assume that the innovator is an interior player L I . The absorbing states are the same when an
, in the absorbing state all players play C because from (5) , interior n−1
Since all H−types still use C we have y H = n. Let us first assume that c is such that he does not imitate D. Then, the number L-types adopting D is increasing because their decision term does not depend on
all H-types play C and the L E -types cycle between C and , then ∆ H I (n − 1, n) > 0, and the H I that observe D will play it in the second period. In the following periods, more and more H I will switch to D since ∆ H I is unchanged as long as only H-types observe D. At some point an H E will observe D. His decision term is ∆ 2 H E , which from (9), is always higher than ∆ H I (n − 1, n). So he will adopt. The next player to E and L < c < 1, the strategy D becomes extinct and the absorbing state is C C, because all decision terms are negative.
Proof of Proposition 6
We first assume that an H-type plays D in period t = 1. If ∆ the equilibrium is the initial strategy distribution, because the neighbors of the inventor do not adopt D, but the H EE keeps playing it.
We focus on c < We conclude that the absorbing state is reached when ∆ 2 H EE is negative (∆ 2 H EE depends positively on y H ). So only an L-dominated state can be an absorbing state. The interpretation is that it will always be an H-type that stops the spread of D. An H-type will at one point halt the spread of D and act as a blocker to the L-types playing C who would adopt D if they would observe D. The higher c is, the earlier the spread of D is halted, that means, the less agents use D in the absorbing state. We conclude that there exist many different absorbing states, depending on population size N and the costs c.
We calculate the number of agents playing C in the absorbing state. Since the absorbing state is L-dominated, we can substitute y L with y H − 1. The solution y H to this inequality must be an odd (even) number if n is even (odd). This comes from the fact that whenever H EE have the decision term ∆ 2 H EE , there is an odd number of H-types playing D. This is because y H decreases by steps of two.
If an L-type agent innovates D in the first period, the same arguments apply.
